Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new compromise value for nontransferable utility games (NTU-games): the Chi-compromise value. As with all compromise values it chooses as the solution of the game the e cient vector lying in the segment between the vectors of maximal and minimal utilities that each player may expect to obtain; that is, it is a compromise between their maximum and minimum aspirations. For pure bargaining problems (that is, situations where all agreements have to be unanimous) the KalaiSmorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) ) is based on a compromise of this type. When partial agreements are possible and utility is transferable across players (that is, TU-games) we de ned (Bergantiños and Mass o (1996) ) a compromise value called the Chi value. Our proposal here extends these two particular solutions to general problems where players may reach partial agreements and utility is not necessarily transferable (that is, NTU-games).
We propose as the maximum aspiration for a player in a game his maximal (among all coalitions) marginal contribution and as the minimum aspiration the maximum remainder he can obtain by going with a coalition of players and o ering them their maximum aspirations. In non-level and totally essential NTU-games our proposed vectors of aspirations have the following three properties: (1) Giving players their maximum aspirations will always exhaust all possible gains from cooperation. (2) The vector of maximum aspirations is component-wise larger than the vector of minimal aspirations. (3) The minimum aspiration obtained in this rather indirect way coincides with the vector of individually rational payo s. We nd this last property interesting because it means that we have as a result that the minimum aspiration for each player in a game coincides with what he can obtain without any cooperation. It seems to us that this property may also be a good indication that the proposed maximum aspiration is meaningful.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section which gives the main notation and concepts. Section 3 contains the de nition of the Chi-compromise value; Propositions 1 and 2 and Corollary 1 which establish that properties (1), (2), and (3) above hold for non-level and totally essential NTU-games; the demonstration that the Chi-compromise value exists for all non-level and totally essential NTU-games; and nally, a number of examples which illustrate the new value. Section 4 provides two characterizations of the Chi-compromise value using the following axioms: Pareto Optimality, Covariance, Symmetry, and Restricted Monotonicity (or Strong Symmetry instead of Symmetry and Restricted Monotonicity). Section 5 proposes (as a generalization of Moulin (1984) 's implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for pure bargaining problems) a non-cooperative extensive-form game whose subgame perfect equilibrium payo s coincide with the Chi-compromise value. Section 6 proposes a di erent compromise value based on applying our Chivalue for TU-games to the characteristic function obtained by the classical transfer approach. Section 7 concludes by comparing, brie y, our value with other well-known NTU-values.
Preliminaries
Players are the elements of a nite set N = f1; :::; ng where n 2. A nonempty subset of players is called a coalition. We denote by s the number of players of coalition S and, abusing notation, by i the singleton set fig. A (cooperative) game with non-transferable utility (NTU-game) is an ordered pair (N; V ) where N = f1; :::; ng is the set of players and V is a mapping, called the characteristic function, which assigns to each non-empty coalition S a non-empty subset of IR S . By convenience, we set V (;) = ;. The set V (S) is interpreted as the collection of payo s or utilities that members of S can reach by cooperating among themselves. We will concentrate only on games with non-transferable utility having the standard properties that for each coalition S, the set V (S) is closed, non-empty, and comprehensive (i.e., x 2 V (S) and y x imply y 2 V (S)). Given x; y 2 IR K , y x means y i x i for all i 2 K while y < x means y i < x i for all i 2 K. Given x 2 IR K and a coalition S K, denote by x S the restriction of x to the coordinates corresponding to the members of S; i.e., x S = (x i ) i2S . For each player i 2 N there exists a payo w i 2 IR, called the individually rational payo , such that V (i) = fx 2 IR j x w i g. Also, for each coalition S, the set V (S) + := fx 2 V (S) j x w S g is bounded. We denote by V N the class of games with non-transferable utility with set of players N .
We will often use the following properties of games with non-transferable utility.
De nition 1. A game (N; V ) is non-level if for each coalition S we have that for all x; y 2 V (S) + such that y x w S and x 6 = y there exists z 2 V (S) with the property that z > x.
De nition 2. A game (N; V ) is totally essential if w S 2 V (S) for all S N .
We denote by C N the subclass of non-level and totally essential games with non-transferable utility.
A solution on a subclass of games
We will consider, and use as references, two special subclasses of games. A game (N; V ) has transferable utility if there is a real-valued function v such that V (S) = x 2 IR S j P i2S x i v (S) ; namely, each coalition S can achieve a maximum level of utility v (S) which can be distributed amongst its members in all possible ways. We denote by v N the subclass of games with transferable utility with set of players N . A generic game with transferable utility will be denoted by (N; v). A game (N; V ) is a bargaining game if it is totally essential and V (S) = x 2 IR S j x w S for every coalition S 6 = N ; namely, there are gains from cooperation and they come only from unanimous agreements. We denote by B N the subclass of bargaining games with set of players N . A generic bargaining game will be denoted by (w; B), where B stands for the set V (N ) and w represents the disagreement point.
We are specially interested in extending two compromise solutions of these subclasses to games with non-transferable utility. The rst one is the KalaiSmorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) ) on bargaining games which represents an e cient compromise between the maximal aspiration of each player, compatible with individual rationality of the others, and the disagreement point. Formally, given (w; B) 2 B N de ne the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, denoted by KS (w; B), as follows:
where M
KS i
(w; B) = max x i 2 IR j x i ; x N ni 2 B and x i ; x N ni w and 2 [0; 1] is such that KS (w; B) 2 P (B). P (B) denotes the Pareto frontier of B. In general, given a set A IR K , the Pareto frontier of A is the set P (A) = fx 2 Aj@y 2 A satisfying y x; y 6 = xg and the weak Pareto frontier of A is the set W P (A) = fx 2 Aj@y 2 A satisfying y > xg. By convenience, we set P (;) = ; and W P (;) = ;. Given a set A and a vector y we say that y is undominated for A if @x 2 A such that x y and x 6 = y.
The second one is the Chi value (Bergantiños and Mass o (1996) ) on the subclass of games with transferable utility. It is also based on selecting an e cient compromise between maximal and minimal aspirations of players. In this case, the maximal aspiration of a player is his largest marginal contribution while his minimal aspiration is the largest remainder he can obtain after conceding to the other players their maximal aspiration. Formally, let (N; v) be a game with transferable utility. For each i 2 N , de ne player i's maximum aspiration in the game as
Given the vector M (N; v) de ne player i's minimum aspiration in the game as
De ne the Chi value on v N , denoted by (N; v), as the unique e cient vector in the lineal segment having as extreme points m (N; v) and M (N; v); that is,
where 2 [0; 1] is such that P i2N i (N; v) = v (N ). Bergantiños and Mass o (1996) showed that the Chi value exists in the class of essential games with transferable utility (i.e.;
3 The Chi-compromise value
In this section we de ne and study a compromise value for NTU-games. Let (N; V ) be a game in V N . For each i 2 N de ne player i's maximum aspiration in the game as
We also have that M i (N; V ) < +1 because V (S) + is compact and
Given the vector M (N; V ) de ne player i's minimal aspiration in the game as
Notice that for each S containing i, the projection of V (S) on i's coordinate is closed and bounded above. Therefore the maximum de ning m i (N; V ) does exist for all (N; V ) in V N .
From now on, and when this does not lead to confusion, we will omit the reference to the game (N; V ) to denote the aspiration vectors m and M .
Propositions 1 and 2 and Corollary 1 below state that the three important properties of the vectors of aspirations already explained in the Introduction hold for non-level and totally essential NTU-games. Proposition 1 says that, for every coalition S, the vector of maximum aspirations is undominated for V (S).
Proof: If S has only one player the result holds. Suppose it is true when S has at most p 1 players; we will show that the statement holds in the case of coalitions with p players. In order to get a contradiction assume that S has p players and M S 2 V (S) n P (V (S)). Then, there exists y S 2 V (S) such that y S M S and i 2 S with y i > M i . As M Sni = 2 V (S n i) n P (V (S n i)) (by the induction hypothesis) and (N; V ) is non-level we can nd x Sni 2 P (V (S n i)) such that x Sni M Sni . Then, by comprehensiveness, y i ; x Sni 2 V (S) and therefore
Proposition 2 below states that, for non-level and totally essential NTUgames, the vector of minimal aspirations coincides, as it should, with the vector of individually rational payo s. But, again, notice that m is obtained endogenously as the maximum reminder after giving to other players in the coalition their maximal aspirations. We interpret this property as an indication that our de nition of maximal aspiration is sensible.
Proof: From Remark 2 we already know that m i w i . To see that m i w i it will be su cient to show that t w i for all t 2 IR and all S N such that i 2 S and (t; M Sni ) 2 V (S). The proof is by induction on the number of players in the coalition S.
Assume that S = fi; jg. If (t; M j ) 2 V (fi; jg) and t > w i then, by comprehensiveness of the game, (x; M j ) 2 V (fi; jg) for all x t, which is impossible by non-levelness of the game and the de nition of M j .
Assuming that the result is true if S contains p 2 players (the induction hypothesis), we will show that it is true for all coalitions with p + 1 players. Let S = fi 1 ; :::; i p ; ig be any set with p + 1 players containing i and assume that (t; M Sni ) 2 V (S).
First we prove that if t > w i and (t; M Sni ) 2 V (S) then (t; M i 1 ; :::
As t > w i ; M j w j for any j 2 N; and V is totally essential we can nd x 2 P (V (S n i p )) such that w Snip x (t; M Snfi;ipg ). Therefore, (x; M ip ) (t; M Sni ) 2 V (S) implying, by non-levelness of the game, that we can nd a vector y 2 V (S) + with the property that y > (x; M ip ). Therefore, y ip > M ip which contradicts the de nition of M ip . Now t w i would follow by the induction hypothesis.
Example 1 below shows that the conclusion of Proposition 2 does not hold for level NTU-games. Example 1. Let (N; V ) be the NTU-game where N = f1; 2g, w 1 = w 2 = 0, and V (N ) = comp (conv (f(1; 1) ; (2; 0)g)). In general, if A IR K , comp(A) denotes the comprehensive hull of A (i.e., the smallest comprehensive set containing A) and conv(A) the convex hull of A. The vector of maximum aspirations is M (N; V ) = (2; 1) and the vector of minimum aspirations is m (N; V ) = (1; 0) which for player 1 is strictly larger than w 1 = 0.
Corollary 1 explicitly states that for non-level and totally essential NTUgames the maximum aspiration is larger or equal to the minimum aspiration.
Proof: It follows immediately from Proposition 2 and Remark 1.
We can now de ne the Chi-compromise value as well as state the most important result of the paper which identi es a large class of games (non-level and totally essential) in which the Chi-compromise value does exist.
De nition 3. The Chi-compromise value, denoted by , is the unique e cient vector in the lineal segment having as extreme points m and M ; that is, for all (N; V ) 2 V N ,
where is the largest number in
Proof: It follows by combining Propositions 1 and 2, and Corollary 1.
Remark 3. It is straightforward to show that the Chi-compromise value coincides with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in bargaining problems and with the Chi value in TU-games.
We now compare more speci cally our value with three compromise values in the literature: the Compromise value of Borm et al. (1992) , the MC-value of Otten et al. (1998) , and the -value of Bergantiños et al. (2000) . Given (N; V ) 2 V N , the Compromise value is de ned as the unique vector on the lineal segment between M C (N; V ) and m C (N; V ) which lies in V (N ) and is closest to M C (N; V ), where for any
The Compromise value exists for the class of compromise admissible NTUgames, de ned as,
Borm et al. (1992) proved that for any (N; V ) 2V N and any i 2 N , m
, and x w N ni , by non-levelness, we can nd
Then, in the class of non-level NTU-games, CA N C N ; that is, if the Compromise value exists then the Chi-compromise value also exists.
Note that if in the de nition of M i we change x 2 P (V (Sni)) to x 2 W P (V (Sni)) (denote this alternative maximum aspiration by M i ) then it is straightforward to check that M i (N; V ) M C i (N; V ) for all NTU-games. Therefore, the corresponding Chi-compromise value using the M vector as maximum aspirations is de ned whenever the Compromise value exists. However, it seems to us that it is more appropriate to obtain the maximum aspiration of a player i in a coalition S as the remainder assuming that the members of coalition Sni exhaust all their possible gains of cooperation by reaching Pareto (and not weakly Pareto) agreements.
The MC-value of Otten et al. (1998) is de ned as the e cient outcome lying on the lineal segment between the vector of individually rational payo s and a vector of maximum aspiration obtained by giving to each player the sum of all his marginal contributions in all possible orderings of the set of players. Since in many cases each component of this upper value vector may be unfeasible it seems di cult to justify it as a vector of maximal aspirations. Otten et al. (1998) showed that the MC-value is well de ned in the class of monotonic, zero-normalized NTU-games, which is unrelated to the class of non-level and totally essential NTU-games.
The -value of Bergantiños et al. (2000) is de ned as the e cient outcome lying on the lineal segment between the vector of individually rational payo s and the vector of maximum aspirations M (N; V ):
The vector of maximum aspirations and the -value are de ned by using induction arguments. When n = 2 the vector of maximum aspirations M (N; V ) is de ned as in the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution M KS . Then, both solutions coincide when n = 2. Suppose now that we have de ned M and when there are at most n 1 players.
The maximum aspiration of player i in the game (N; V ) is de ned as
Bergantiños et al. (2000) prove that the -value exists for all non-level and superadditive NTU-games 
It is easy to check that the class of non-level and totally essential NTU-games, where the Chicompromise value exists, is larger that the class of non-level and superadditive NTU-games, where the -value exists.
We end this section by calculating the Chi-compromise value in three well-known examples of NTU-games and comparing it with other proposed values.
Example 2 (Roth (1980) ). Let (N; V ) be an NTU-game such that N = f1; 2; 3g,
V (f1; 2g) = f(x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 IR f1;2g j (x 1 ; x 2 ) (0:5; 0:5)g; V (f1; 3g) = f(x 1 ; x 3 ) 2 IR f1;3g j (x 1 ; x 3 ) (0:25; 0:75)g; For this example the Shapley-NTU value (Aumann (1985) ) is (0:333; 0:333; 0:333), the Harsanyi-NTU value (Harsanyi (1963) ) is (0:416; 0:416; 0:166), the Consistent value Owen (1989, 1992) ) is (0:25; 0:25; 0:5), the MCvalue coincides with the Shapley-NTU value, the Compromise value is (0:5; 0:5; 0), and the -value is (0:286; 0:286; 0:428) : Although the game does not satisfy non-levelness we can compute the Chi-compromise value, which is (0:5; 0:5; 0), the unique Core outcome.
Example 3 (Shafer (1980) ). We present the modi cation of Shafer (1980) 's example as it was used in Hart and Kurz (1983) . Consider the following exchange economy with three agents and two commodities. The initial commodity bundles of agents 1, 2, and 3 are , and their respective utility functions, u i , are given by u 1 (y; z) = u 2 (y; z) = minfy; zg; and u 3 (y; z) = y + z 2 :
Following Shapley and Shubik (1969) the corresponding NTU-game (N; V ) is given by:
and V (N ) = fx 2 IR N j (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) (1; 1; 1); x 1 + x 2 + x 3 1g:
In this game the Shapley-NTU value is , the Harsanyi-NTU value is , the MC-value coincides with the Shapley-NTU value, the Compromise value is ; ; and the -value is 2 2" 5 ; 2 2" 5 ;
1+4" 5
The Chi-compromise value is Owen (1972) ). Let (N; V ) be an NTU-game such that N = f1; 2; 3g;
V (f1; 2g) = f(x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 IR f1;2g j x 1 + 4x 2 100; x 1 100; x 2 25g;
V (f2; 3g) = f(x 2 ; x 3 ) 2 IR f2;3g j x 2 0; x 3 0g;
and
x i 100; 8i 2 N; x i 100; 8i; j 2 N; x i + x j 100g:
In this example the Shapley-NTU value is (50; 50; 0), the 
Characterizations of the Chi-compromise value
In this section we study several properties of the Chi-compromise value. Moreover two characterizations of the Chi-compromise value are provided. To do that, let G N V N be an arbitrary subclass of NTU-games and let ' be a solution on G N .
Pareto Optimality. The solution ' satis es Pareto Optimality on
Covariance. The solution ' satis es Covariance on G N if '(N; W ) = '(N; V ) + whenever (N; V ); (N; W ) 2G N are such that for all S N , W (S) = S V (S) + S , where S V (S) = ( i x i ) i2S j x S 2 V (S) ; 2 IR N ; > 0 and 2 IR N .
Players i and j have a symmetric position in a game (N; V ) if (1) for S N n fi; jg, x 2 V (S [ i) i y 2 V (S [ j) when y S = x S and y j = x i and (2) for S fi; jg; x 2 S i y 2 S when y Snfi;jg = x Snfi;jg ; y i = x j , and y j = x i . 
Symmetry
Proposition 3. The Chi-compromise value satis es Pareto Optimality, Covariance, Symmetry, Strong Symmetry, and Restricted Monotonicity on the class C N of non-level and totally essential games with non-transferable utility.
Proof: It is straightforward to check that the Chi-compromise value satis es these ve properties.
Theorem 2. The Chi-compromise value is the unique solution on C N satisfying Pareto Optimality, Covariance, Symmetry, and Restricted Monotonicity.
Proof:
We have just established in Proposition 3 that the Chi-compromise value satis es the four properties. We now prove uniqueness. Suppose F is another solution satisfying the four properties. Assume that w = 2 P (V (N )) ; otherwise the result is trivial. First we prove that if (N; V ) 2 C N and w = 2 P (V (N )) then for all i 2 N , M i (N; V ) > w i : As w 2 V (N ) n P (V (N )) and (N; V ) satis es non-levelness there exists x 2 V (N ) ; x > w: Given i 2 N , as V ( Theorem 3. The Chi-compromise value is the unique solution on C N satisfying Pareto Optimality, Covariance, and Strong Symmetry.
Proof: Proposition 3 establishes that the Chi-compromise value satis es these properties. We now prove uniqueness. Suppose F is another solution satisfying these properties. Using similar arguments to those already used in the proof of Theorem 2 we can assume that for all i 2 N , M i (N; V ) > w i : By Covariance it su ces to prove that (N; V ) = F (N; V ) when, for all i 2 N , w i = 0 and M i (N; V ) = 1.
By Strong Symmetry, for all i; j 2 N; F i (N; V ) = F j (N; V ) and i (N; V ) = j (N; V ). By Pareto Optimality, F (N; V ) = (N; V ). Note that all axioms used in both characterizations are independent. The egalitarian solution de ned by Kalai and Samet (1985) satis es all ve properties except Covariance. The solution f 1 de ned as f 1 (N; V ) = w for all (N; V ) 2C N satis es all properties except Pareto Optimality. The solution f 2 de ned as the Shapley value when (N; V ) is a totally essential TU-game and the Chi-compromise value in the rest of the class C N satis es all properties except Strong Symmetry and Restricted Monotonicity. The solution f 3 de ned as f These axiomatic characterizations can be extended in the following way. Theorem 2 is also true for the class of NTU-games for which the Chicompromise value exists and the condition of non-levelness is satis ed only for the set V (N ) + . Theorem 3 is also true for the class of NTU-games where the Chi-compromise value exists.
Moreover, notice that in both characterizations the sets V (S) need not be convex. While this is also possible in the characterization of the MC-value it is not the case in the characterization of the Compromise value where the set V (N ) has to be convex.
Implementation of the -value
Following the Nash program, there is a long tradition of justifying axiomatic bargaining solutions by means of equilibria of a non-cooperative game associated to the original bargaining problem. Moulin (1984) exhibits an extensiveform game whose subgame perfect equilibria induce the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Here, and following the procedure used by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) to obtain the Consistent value by extending the non-cooperative implementation of the Nash bargaining solution to NTU-games (which also coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games), we extend Moulin's implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for bargaining problems to NTU-games (which also coincides with the Chi value for TU-games).
Given a NTU-game (N; V ), we de ne the non-cooperative n-person game (N; V ) as follows: Round 0. Each player i makes a bid p i , where 0 < p i 1, and they are renumbered in decreasing order of their bids, p 1 p 2 ::: p n (players with tied bids are ordered randomly among themselves).
Round 1. Player 1 proposes a payo vector x = (x 1 ; :::; x n ) 2 V (N ) to the approval of player n, who can either accept or reject it. If player n accepts x the game proceeds to round 2. If player n rejects x then he must choose a pair (S n ; x n ), where S n N; n 2 S n ; and x n 2 V (S n ). Player n proposes to the other players of S n to cooperate with him to obtain a payo of x n . Players in S n may accept or reject x n but they are forced to accept it if there is no a payo vector y 2 V (S n nn) such that y > x n S n nn . There are two cases to be considered:
1. If all players in S n nn accept x n then a lottery is held in which, with probability p 1 the agreement achieved by the players of S n is implemented (that is, every player j 2 S n obtains x n j , except player 1, if 1 2 S n , who receives w 1 ). The exceptional treatment to player 1 (the proposer) is to dissuade him from putting forward unreasonable proposals that make unanimous agreement impossible. Players of N n S n return to round 0 and continue to bargain among themselves. With probability 1 p 1 the bargaining procedure nishes and every player i 2 N obtains w i .
If any player of S
n rejects x n then player n is removed from the bargaining procedure; i.e., player n obtains w n . Let R(n) be the set of players who rejected (S n ; x n ) and i n the player of this set with the largest index. Player i n must propose a payo vector z 2 V (S n nn) such that z > x n S n nn , which exists because i n rejected x n . With probability p 1 the payo vector z is implemented (that is, every player j 2 S n nn obtains z j ) and the players of N nS n return to round 0 and continue to bargain among themselves. With probability 1 p 1 the bargaining procedure nishes and every player i 2 N obtains w i .
Round 2. Player 1 proposes the payo vector x = (x 1 ; :::; x n ) to the approval of player n 1, who can either accept it or reject it. If he accepts it the game proceeds to round 3.
If he rejects he must make a countero er (S n 1 ; x n 1 ), where n 1 2 S n 1 and x n 1 2 V (S n 1 ), and the game proceeds as in the previous round replacing the role of player n by player n 1. Rounds 3; :::; n 1 are similar to rounds 1 and 2 but now considering players n 2; :::; 2 instead of players n and n 1.
Remark 4. Since the number of players is nite, the game (N; V ) terminates in a nite number of steps.
Remark 5. Round 0 is the same than Round 0 in Moulin (1984) . Rounds 1,2,...,n 1 are similar to rounds 1,2,...,n 1 of Moulin (1984) . The di erence is that in Moulin (1984) , if some player rejects the initial o er he must make a countero er to the rest of the players, who can reject or accept it. If somebody rejects it the disagreement point is enforced. However, in our game the player who rejected the initial o er can make a proposal to some smaller coalition. This modi cation is necessary because in NTU-games partial agreements are also possible. Moreover, when we restrict our procedure to a non-cooperative game induced by a bargaining game it coincides, basically, with Moulin (1984) . The only di erence is that in Moulin (1984) when a player makes a counterproposal the rest of the players always can reject it (in such a case, all receive the disagreement point). However, in our game players can not reject an o er which gives them at least the disagreement point.
Remark 6. Bergantiños et al. (2000) also gives an implementation of the -value using a non-cooperative game which generalizes Moulin (1984) . We now compare the non-cooperative game de ned in this paper and the one described in Bergantiños et al. (2000) . Round 0 is the same in both noncooperative games. Round 1 is di erent in two aspects. First, in our case players in S n are forced to accept x n if there is no a payo vector y 2 V (S n nn) such that y > x n S n nn ; in Bergantiños et al. (2000) players in S n can reject any o er. Second, if x n is rejected, in our non-cooperative game player i n must propose a payo vector z 2 V (S n nn) such that z > x n S n nn , with probability p 1 the payo vector z is implemented and with probability 1 p 1 every player i 2 S n obtains w i ; in Bergantiños et al. (2000) if x n is rejected then with probability p 1 players in S n n n return to Round 0 and continue to bargain among themselves and with probability 1 p 1 every player i 2 S n obtains w i : The same two di erences (adjusted in the natural way) also apply to the remaining rounds 2,...,n 1.
We now present the main result of this section which says that the noncooperative game described above implements in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategies the Chi-compromise value.
Theorem 4. Let (N; V ) be a non-level and totally essential NTU-game. Then, the non-cooperative game (N; V ) has subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). Moreover, the payo received by the players in all of them is (N; V ).
Proof: Let (N; V ) be a non-level and totally essential NTU-game. The proof is by induction on the number of players. Case n = 2: It is easy to check that the set of SPNE of (f1; 2g; V ) coincides with the set of SPNE of the game of auctioning fractions of dictatorship, Moulin (1984) , applied to the bargaining problem ((w 1 ; w 2 ); V (f1; 2g)). Then, by Moulin (1984) , this set is non-empty and the payo received by the two players in all of these equilibria is the payo vector KS((w 1 ; w 2 ); V (f1; 2g)), which is equal to (f1; 2g; V ). Hence, the statement of Theorem 4 holds whenever n = 2. Induction hypothesis: Assume that the statement of Theorem 4 holds when there are strictly less than n players. Now, the proof that the statement of Theorem 4 is also true when there are n players is based on Lemmas 1 and 2 below. . If the procedure goes back to Round 0 then, there is, at most, n 1 players. Hence, de ne in these subgames as the behavior prescribed by an arbitrary SPNE strategy of the game with at most n 1 players, whose existence is guaranteed by the induction hypothesis.
Notice that the play prescribed by is that the selected player (all of them with equal probability) proposes (N; V ) and the rest accept it. Hence, the expected payo induced by in (N; V ) is the Chi-compromise value of (N; V ).
To prove that is an SPNE we have to show that no player, in any of its information sets, has incentives to deviate from .
First, if the game goes back to Round 0, by the de nition of , no player has a pro table deviation.
Second, assume player i rejected the initial o er of player 1 and proposed, according with , (S i ; x i ). Then, all players in S i ni are forced to accept it since there is no z 2 V (
Third, player i has no pro table deviation from proposing (S i ; x i ), which is what speci es after he rejects an initial o er. To see it, suppose that player i proposes any (Ŝ i ;x i ) with the property thatx
Then, at least one player inŜ i ni will reject it and player i will get w i . Therefore, if player i wants to obtain more than w i he must o er an acceptable proposal; that is, a pair ( S i ; x i ) with the property that x
, otherwise, at least one player will reject it. Among all of these pairs, to o er the pair (S i ; x i ) speci ed by is the best, which gives to player i the payo of M i (N; V ) with probability p and w i with probability 1 p; i.e., i (N; V ).
As a consequence of the last two arguments (second and third) we can conclude that no player has incentives to reject the initial proposal (N; V ).
Fourth, we show that player 1 does not get a strictly higher payo by proposing x 6 = (N; V ). Suppose that x N n1 N n1 (N; V ), then the rest of the players will accept x; hence, player 1 gets x 1 1 (N; V ) because x 2 V (N ) and (N; V ) 2 P (V (N )). Suppose now that there exists i 6 = 1 with x i < i (N; V ). Then, x will be rejected by player n, who will propose, according to , the pair (S n ; x n ), which will be accepted by the members of S n since there is no y 2 V (S n nn) such that y > x n S n nn . Now we distinguish two cases:
If 1 2 S n player 1 gets w 1 , which is not larger than 1 (N; V ).
If 1 2 N nS n player 1 gets, by the induction hypothesis, 1 (N nS n ; V j N nS n ) with probability p and w 1 with probability 1 p. Taking into account that 1 (N nS n ; V j N nS n ) M 1 (N nS n ; V j N nS n ) M 1 (N; V ) we conclude that (also in this case) player 1 cannot get a strictly larger payo than 1 (N; V ).
Finally, we show that, at stage 0, to make a bid di erent from p is not a pro table deviation. Suppose that player i bids p i < p, which implies that i is not the initial proposer. If he rejects (N; V ) then, as we saw before, he obtains at most i (N; V ). Suppose now that player i bids p i > p. Then, he becomes player 1 and must make an o er x 2 V (N ). If there exists a player j 6 = 1 such that x j < p 1 M j (N; V ) + (1 p 1 )w j , x will be rejected and using similar arguments to those used before we can conclude that player 1 gets at most 1 (N; V ) . If x N n1 N n1 (N; V ), x will be accepted but since x 2 V (N ) and (N; V ) 2 P (V (N )) we conclude that x 1 < 1 (N; V ). Therefore, is an SPNE of (N; V ).
Lemma 2. In any SPNE of (N; V ) any player i has an expected payo of at least i (N; V ).
Proof of Lemma 2: First we prove that if player i 6 = 1 rejects the o er of player 1 and the players of N n i are playing according to an SPNE then player i gets p 1 M i (N; V )+(1 p 1 )w i . Suppose that player i proposes (S i ; x i ). Using similar arguments to those already used in the proof of Lemma 1 we can conclude that player i has to propose (S i ; x i ) as in and players in S i will accept it, which means that player i gets M i (N; V ) with probability p 1 and w i with probability (1 p 1 ). We can also show that player i can not obtain strictly more. We now prove that in any SPNE any player i 6 = 1 receives at least p 1 M i (N; V )+(1 p 1 )w i . We prove it by nding a deviation of player i which gives him p 1 M i (N; V ) + (1 p 1 )w i . Assume that player i 6 = 1 makes a bid p 0 i < p n instead of p i : Then player i (although he becomes player n we will still refer to him as player i) is the rst who answers the o er of player 1. If player i rejects it we proved before that he will receive p 1 M i (N; V ) + (1 p 1 )w i . Now, to get a contradiction, suppose that there exists an SPNE where a player, i, receives a payo y i < i (N; V ). We study several cases:
1. p 1 > p. Then, player i cannot be a responder; otherwise, we have just proved that his payo would be at least p 1 M i + (1 p 1 )w i , which is strictly larger than pM i + (1 p)w i = i (N; V ). Therefore, i is the proposer, and hence, i = 1. Now we distinguish two cases: p 2 p. Suppose that player 1 makes a bid p 0 1 < p n . Then, if he rejects the o er of player 2 he obtains p 2 M 1 (N; V ) + (1 p 2 )w 1 1 (N; V ), as we saw at the beginning of the proof. But this is a contradiction because we found a deviation of player 1 (p 0 1 < p 1 ) which strictly improves his payo . p 2 < p. Suppose player 1 makes a bid p and o ers x 2 P (V (N )) such that x 1 > y 1 and for all i 6 = 1, x i = i (N; V ) + where > 0 is chosen in an appropriate and obvious way. The players of N n 1 will accept x (if player i rejects x we already proved that he would obtain pM i (N; V ) + (1 p)w i = i (N; V ) ). Then, player 1 can strictly improve his payo by bidding p instead of p 1 , which is a contradiction.
2. p 1 < p. Suppose player i makes a bid p. Then, he becomes the winner of the auction because p 1 was the largest bid (again, we will still refer to him as player i). Moreover, assume that i o ers any x 2 P (V (N )) with the property that x i > y i and for all j 6 = i, x j = j (N; V ) + where > 0 is chosen in an appropriate way. Players in N n i will accept x (we have already proved that if player j rejects x he would obtain pM j (N; V ) + (1 p)w j = j (N; V )). Then, player i can strictly improve his payo by bidding p instead of p i , which is a contradiction.
3. p 1 = p. We study several cases:
i 6 = 1. If player i makes a bid p 0 i < p n with similar arguments to the case p 1 > p and p 2 p we obtain that player i can strictly improve his payo . i = 1 and p 2 = p. If player 1 makes a bid p 0 1 < p n with similar arguments to the case p 1 > p and p 2 p we obtain that player 1 can strictly improve his payo . i = 1 and p 2 < p. Again, with similar arguments to those used in the case p 1 > p and p 2 < p we can conclude that player 1 can strictly improve his payo .
The proof of Theorem 4 nishes by noticing that by the de nition of (N; V ) and Lemma 2 in any SPNE each player i has an expected payo of i (N; V ) because (N; V ) 2 P (V (N )).
6 The Lambda-transfer Chi-value Shapley (1969) de ned the family of -transfer TU-games corresponding to an NTU-game. Using this family of games, and their corresponding Shapley values, he de ned the NTU-Shapley value. We proceed in the same way using our Chi value for TU-games instead of the Shapley value.
De ne N = 2 IR N j P i2N i = 1 and i 0 for all i as the n-dimensional unit simplex. Given an NTU-game (N; V ) we say that the vector 2 N is feasible if sup P Before stating a result establishing su cient conditions under which the Lambda-transfer Chi-value set is non-empty we need to de ne two standard properties of NTU-games.
De nition 5. An NTU-game (N; V ) is compactly generated if for all S N there exists a compact set K S IR S with the property that V (S) = x 2 IR S j x yfor some y 2 K S . An NTU-game (N; V ) is convex if for all S N the set V (S) is convex.
Theorem 5. Let (N; V ) be a totally essential, compactly generated, and convex NTU-game. Then, (N; V ) 6 = ;.
Proof: First, we will show that if the NTU-game (N; V ) is totally essential then for any feasible 2 N the TU-game N; v is essential. Consider any i 2 N . By de nition v (i) = i w i . Moreover, as (N; V ) is totally essential,
which means that the TU-game N; v is essential. The non-emptiness of the set (N; V ) follows using a xed-point argument similar to that of Shapley (1969) .
The game of Example 2 illustrates the fact that, in general, the Chicompromise value and the Lambda-transfer Chi-value may be di erent. After a simple, but very tedious computation, it is possible to see that (N; V ) = (0:33; 0:33; 0:33) while (N; V ) = (0:5; 0:5; 0) :
Concluding remarks
Before nishing this paper we would like to brie y compare our proposal with other NTU-values. As with all compromise values it is easier to compute than the Shapley, Harsanyi, and the Consistent values. However, the Shapley and Harsanyi values have nice characterizations, while those of all compromise values including ours are ad hoc (in the sense that the vectors of maximum and minimum aspirations are used in the de nitions of some of the key axioms); on the contrast, to our knowledge the Consistent value has yet to be fully characterized (Maschler and Owen (1989) characterize it for the class of hyperplane games). Except for the Compromise value and the -value, whose existence is guaranteed only for games with non-empty cores (a proper subclass of compromise admissible NTU-games) and superadditive games respectively, the existence of all other NTU-values is guaranteed for classes of games which are relatively larger than these and unrelated to each other. Finally, to our knowledge, only the Consistent value (Hart and MasColell (1996) ), the -value, and our Chi-compromise value have been shown to be implementable by extensive-form games.
